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MEMORANDUM FOR:

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[Handwritten signature]
24 DEC 1983

1. The attached paper, Libyan Training of Foreign Dissidents, was done at McFarlane's request of last Friday. A copy goes at Tab D of your McFarlane book and the original is provided for you (DCI) to pass to McFarlane this evening.

2. OGI is working on a second paper on terrorist training world wide, probably to be completed in January.



Date 21 Dec 83

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

21 December 1983

Libyan Training of Foreign Dissidents

Summary

Tripoli has trained foreigners in commando and small unit tactics [redacted] inside Libya since the mid-1970s. [redacted]

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[redacted] Qadhafi clearly believes that providing military training enhances Libya's reputation with revolutionary groups, while helping to intimidate or destabilize countries opposed to his goals. We believe that it will continue as long as he remains in power. [redacted]

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Since 1981--probably the peak year of Qadhafi's subversive efforts--Libyan training of foreign nationals has declined somewhat. We believe this is largely due to the less radical posture the Libyan leader adopted in 1982 to ease his regional isolation. Recent training has involved principally North and Sub-Saharan African dissidents, particularly Sudanese and Chadian rebels. [redacted]

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 21 December 1983 was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, [redacted]

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Recipients of Subversive Training

We believe that Libya's military training programs were originally designed for Palestinians and other Arabs planning operations against Israel. However, as Qadhafi's ambitions as a revolutionary leader grew and the more moderate elements of the PLO increasingly downgraded terrorism as a tool, the Libyans began to offer training to radical groups and subversives in many parts of the world. [REDACTED]

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Qadhafi's erratic relations with the Palestinians, especially PLO leader Arafat and his Fatah group, soured significantly after the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut in the late summer of 1982. [REDACTED]

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African dissident and subversive groups have emerged in the 1980s as favorite candidates for Libyan training. Although Qadhafi appears willing to offer training to anti-Western forces worldwide, Libya clearly has logistical advantages in Africa, where trainees can be moved into the country with relative ease. Transportation problems and the expense probably are the reasons why so few Latin American dissidents have received training in Libya. [REDACTED]

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Libyan interest in subversion in Latin America has grown during the last two years because of Qadhafi's interest in striking at the US in its own backyard. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Libyan Training: Problems and Prospects

Libya has expended considerable effort over the years in its training programs for foreign nationals, but we believe that the results have been disappointing from Qadhafi's point of view. Part of the difficulty has arisen because of the generally low quality of the trainees involved and the factionalism that has undermined the effectiveness of many of the groups supported by Libya, particularly in Chad and Sudan. The Libyans have caused many of the difficulties associated with their training of foreign nationals by giving poor instruction laced with heavy doses of Qadhafi's strange ideology. Many trainees reportedly are forced into camps against their will, and do not necessarily remain allied with Libya after their release. [REDACTED]

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Despite these difficulties and irritants, we believe that Qadhafi will continue to offer military training to a wide variety of groups as long as their political orientation and goals are at least somewhat compatible with Qadhafi's. Training activity may fluctuate with the political climate, but Qadhafi clearly sees it as enhancing Libya's influence and prestige throughout the world. [REDACTED]

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